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作者是摩根士丹利亚洲的首席经济学家,研究除日本之外的亚洲宏观经济。(转载) |
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自由原子弹 [博客] [个人文集]
游客
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作者:游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
Gathering Clouds(ZT)
*****Protectionist measures imposed by the US could be imminent The US political system is responding to manufacturing job losses during a political season. This could result in textile quotas being reintroduced or maintained or high tariffs being applied to industrial commodities. China's exports could be significantly affected in 2004. ****China's credit tightening is cooling the property sector China needs to slow growth in the property sector so that it is more in line with GDP growth. Property has been growing at three times GDP. A slowdown in this sector could cut GDP growth by two percentage points. ****Consumption should shine for the next two years Property has attracted a disproportionate share of household expenditure. As property growth moves into line with GDP growth, household expenditure for consumption should be normalized.
Summary and Conclusion ---------------------- Clouds are gathering over China's economic outlook for 2004. US presidential politics will likely lead to protectionist measures that apply to China's exports. Multinational investors are more hesitant about setting up production in China because of the threatening noises over China's exchange rate structure. China's property sector must slow quickly to prevent a financial collapse, in our view.
Exports probably contributed five percentage points and property a further three percentage points to China's GDP increase in the first half of 2003. It is conceivable that the two sectors' contribution to GDP growth will be cut by half in 2004.
Consumption could be China's bright spot from next year. Household savings deposits increased by 19% in August from last year's level and may reach 90% of GDP (or Rmb10.3 trillion) this year compared with 68% in 1998 and 45% in 1992. Furthermore, public housing flats have been privatized at one-third to one-fourth of today's market prices, adding a further 30% of GDP in household wealth. Chinese households are strongly positioned to support a sustained consumption boom, in our view.
Protectionism in the Air ------------------------ Employment in US manufacturing has suddenly declined in the past three years to 14.7 million jobs after fluctuating between 17 and 18 million for 15 years (Exhibit 1). The US political system is feeling the intense pressure as presidential politics heat up. Unless the US labor market improves soon through rapid expansion of service employment, some protectionist measures look inevitable.
The US could possibly reinstate or maintain MFA quotas in textiles and apply high tariffs to some commodity industries similar to what occurred in the steel sector. Higher tariffs on selected products in other sectors are also possible. The US National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) may use Section 301 to pick and choose its strategy. The US is unlikely to increase tariffs on Chinese products alone since this would simply shift demand to other countries.
The Failure of MBA Capitalism ----------------------------- American politicians have singled out China's currency peg to the dollar as the main culprit of their current economic woes. The validity of this argument (see "Currency Intervention Likely to Resume", September 22, 2003) does not appear to be important as US politicians consider possible actions.
Many US manufacturers know that the result of a modest renminbi appreciation would be either no change in their competitive positions or simply a shift in demand to other low-cost countries like Vietnam. This is why they are pushing for quantitative measures or high tariffs on selected products.
US manufacturers appear to be using China as an easy target for pushing the US towards protectionism in general. The business reality explains why they have adopted such a stance. Most US manufacturing industries have lost their quality edge in the global market. They must now compete on price to survive. This means that the US should lower wages in manufacturing to levels in developing countries. This is clearly not possible. The US has, therefore, little choice but to resort to protectionism to hang onto most of its manufacturing jobs, in my view.
How the US lost its competitiveness is a complicated story. American politicians blame it on the strong dollar. But, the US is losing market shares to countries with similar or higher wages. The automobile industry is a good example. The most likely culprit, in my view, is that the US has adopted "MBA" capitalism in the past two decades. Financial bureaucrats rather than entrepreneurs now dominate the great American corporations. This has turned out to be a disaster for America's competitiveness. American business schools may have destroyed US manufacturing competitiveness for good.
Uncertainty Unsettles Foreign Investors ---------------------------------------- All the noise on China, especially with respect to its currency, will likely have an impact on foreign investors' confidence in China's stability as a supply base for the global economy. Multinational corporations were already concerned about supply concentration in China after the SARS crisis. The focus of protectionist sentiment on China increases the perception of risks in basing production in China.
A massive wave of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China followed its entry into the WTO. This kicked off another period of rapid productivity growth in China. While it is too early to estimate the rate of productivity growth, my guesstimate is that total factor productivity is considerably above the 4% that I estimate for the period 1980-2000.
The combination of rapid productivity growth and unlimited supply of labor across the skill spectrum make China an incomparable production base. Hence, there is a tendency for an industry suddenly to migrate to China en masse. Whenever the production of a product is found to work effectively in China, the low cost makes similar production elsewhere unviable.
Assuming no interference of political intervention against market forces, China should have 50% or more market share for any industry that becomes rooted in China. Indeed, we have observed such market shares for China in soft goods industries (e.g., shoes, toys, garments). Consumer electronics and telecom equipment are likely to follow a similar pattern. However, it appears that political forces may be interrupting the process. Even though FDI contracts could exceed US$100 billion in 2003, realized FDI may slow next year (Exhibit 2).
A slowdown in FDI would have a negative impact on exports. Enterprises with foreign investment accounted for 65% of China's export increase in the first eight months of 2003. If FDI slows, China's exports will slow.
Domestic companies will try to occupy whatever space foreign companies vacate. However, they are likely to face greater difficulty in accessing foreign markets, as they could easily be subject to discrimination by foreign buyers or even in the customs process. They would probably be successful in tapping overseas markets over time, which would then result in product prices reflecting China's cost structure. This force would eventually require multinational companies to follow market forces once again.
Property Threatens Stability ---------------------------- Since China introduced home mortgage in 1998, the property sector has taken off rapidly. Both new projects and sales have risen by 24% a year in terms of square meters or three times GDP growth. We estimate property sales will reach 9.2% of GDP this year compared with 3.9% in 1998. The property sector has accounted directly for one-fifth of China's GDP increase since 1998. The multiplier effect could be as much as 1.5-2, in my view. I estimate property could explain most of China's GDP growth other than exports since 1998.
Exhibit 3 Property Boom Threatens to Burst ---------------------------------------------------------------- New Starts Completed Sold Avg Sales Price Total Residential ----------(mn sq m)----------- (Yuan/sq m) ----------------------------------------------------------------
1995 154 131 60 1996 126 144 76 1997 128 138 79 1977 1998 188 154 107 2002 1999 216 198 134 1984 2000 283 230 170 2103 1952 2001 359 273 208 2226 2068 2002 423 325 250 2291 Jan-Aug 02 247 93 93 2319 2170 Jan-Aug 03 325 124 126 2422 2271 -------------------------------------------------------------- Source: CEIC.
By the end of 2003, 1.2 billion square meters of property could be under construction. I estimate loans tied among property developers at 80% of sales value or more. This would put development loans at Rmb2.3 trillion. Material producers also depend on earnings from the property sector for servicing their loans. If the property sector were to grow three times as fast as GDP for a further two years, this could cause a financial crisis, in my view.
The central government is trying to prevent such an eventuality by limiting credit growth. The banking sector's claims on the non-financial sector (NFS) increased by Rmb1.9 trillion in the first half of 2003 compared with a Rmb2.8 trillion increase in 2002. The central government is trying to keep the credit increase below the previous year's level, which implies a cut in loan growth in the second half of 2003 to Rmb900 billion. I estimate the macro tightening should cut property sector growth by half to about 12%.
The tightening is probably timely enough to prevent a financial crisis. But growth in the property sector will have to be in line with GDP growth in the future to ensure financial stability. I calculate this would reduce China's GDP growth rate by at least two percentage points.
Consumption Should Remain Strong --------------------------------- Chinese household wealth is below equilibrium, and so wealth accumulation has to be faster than consumption. This is why retail sales tend to follow household savings deposits with a lag (Exhibit 4). Retail sales and household savings deposits diverged sharply in 2002 and have continued to do so in 2003. This is not surprising as the property sector has been attracting a rising share of household expenditure.
As the macro tightening lowers property sector growth, household expenditure for consumption should also be normalized. Consumption was at 58% of GDP - an historical low - last year. It could hit 57% this year. However, the cooling property sector should reverse this trend.
China's public housing flats have been privatized at one-third to one-fourth of today's prices. This wealth redistribution could amount to 30% of GDP in favor of the household sector. The balance sheet of Chinese households is in incredibly strong shape, which should support consumption strength for years.
Furthermore, if exports come under pressure, the government would likely respond this time by stimulating consumption. In 1998, the government boosted infrastructure investment and housing to improve the economy. As investment levels are already high, the government's only option in the event of economic difficulties is to stimulate consumption.
China's Growth Should Remain Resilient --------------------------------------- China is facing the greatest uncertainty in its economic outlook since 1999. The current situation is perhaps more challenging than in 1998 because the reason for the expected difficulties is the inability of the global economy to digest China's rapid growth.
China is pursuing modernization with whatever means or methods available. It has maneuvered through major difficulties in the past. China should be able to find the right responses this time.
First, China could pursue measures to lessen the political pressure in the US on China. For example, major purchases of agricultural commodities could win goodwill from the politically important farm states.
Second, China could announce a timetable for phasing out all tax privileges for foreign investors. China's cost structure is likely low enough to attract FDI without such concessions.
Third, China could open up more sectors to foreign investment. FDI into China's financial sector could improve financial efficiency and rope western interests further into China's development process.
Fourth, China should announce a timetable for opening its capital account. This would, of course, require a similar timetable for financial reforms.
Fifth, China should expand its involvement in global affairs, such as peace-keeping missions, to increase its bargaining power in economic matters. China's role in the negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program has already generated considerable benefits for the country.
Andy Xie (Hong Kong)
作者:游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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- 作者是摩根士丹利亚洲的首席经济学家,研究除日本之外的亚洲宏观经济。(转载) -- 自由原子弹 - (26758 Byte) 2003-10-11 周六, 11:48 (1404 reads)
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